Security and Non-proliferation, issue 2(20)

Security and Non-proliferation, issue 2(20)

Dear Reader,
On April 9, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad proclaimed during the Nuclear Technology Day festivities, “I proudly announce that as of today Iran is among the countries which produce nuclear fuel on an industrial scale.” Iran assures that its nuclear programme is strictly peaceful. “To date, no deviation from the peaceful nature of Iranian nuclear programme has been recorded,” Ahmadinejad emphasized. The President said that Iran would not bow to the world community’s pressure and would keep on implementing its nuclear programme. According to him, some States around the world have been using the UN Security Council as a political tool in an attempt to prevent Iran from mastering advanced know-how, nuclear technology in particular.

The U.S. has already called that Tehran statement “another case of defiance”, now that the UN Security Council unanimously approved the 24 March Resolution toughening the sanctions against Iran in order to coerce it to halt its uranium enrichment activities. In late May the IAEA Director-General ElBaradei will again report on the Iranian nuclear programme, pursuant to UN SC Resolution 1747 of 24 March. Following a consideration of his report, further decisions will be adopted with respect to Iran.

Russia and China, supporters of the milder approach contemplating but economic pressure on the defiant country, are having a hard time indeed. Experts discuss the likelihood of the U.S. venturing upon the use of force to address the Iranian concern while Iranian President’s statements enhance the rationale for implementing the forceful scenario. The Journal’s Editorial Board has been closely monitoring the developments concerning Iran and North Korea as we publish our articles on the subject in almost every issue. The issue you are reading now is no exception. D. Friedman analyzed the recent events of concern for these countries’ nuclear programmes in her article “A Pause as a Diplomacy Technique”.
The article by S. Kondratov “Some Words on Nuclear Myths, Nuclear Weapons and the Closed Nuclear Fuel Cycle” discusses, based on the most recent findings of foreign nuclear non-proliferation research, a variety of analytical approaches to problems of current relevance for Ukraine, which concern creating nuclear fuel cycle elements in our country and periodically fall the victim of political speculations.

G. Gdanska devoted her article to a review of recent events related to the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction – an initiative intended to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

The sad Chernobyl Disaster anniversary led our April issue to incorporate an article by O. Nasvit, dwelling on quite a controversial issue of radiation risk compensation mechanisms applied in Ukraine. The author maintains that “a State with an eye on future nuclear industry development should not tread the path of maintaining and multiplying reliefs and compensations for radiation risks. It only nourishes misapprehension of radiation risks within the society and will become a major setback to nuclear industry development as civil society institutions are further enhanced in Ukraine.” The Editorial Board will cordially welcome other thoughts on the problems of nuclear non-proliferation, Chernobyl legislation, and international cooperation in the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, raised by the contributors to this issue of our periodical.

We are open for cooperation with you, our Reader. Editorial Board

Security and Non-proliferation, issue 2(20)