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Terrorists thrust their own scenario upon the G8 Summit, but did not shake the world leaders' resolve to carry on the fight against terrorism

The first ten days of July 2005 are likely to remain a long-lasting memory both to Londoners, and, possibly, all Brits. For a few days Great Britain was the focus of the world community's attention. Indeed, happy faces of thousands of Londoners and other Brits who had learned that London had been elected to host the 2012 Olympics could initially be seen on all leading TV news channels. In parallel to the celebrations of this victory, Great Britain was finalizing preparatory work for this year's G8 Summit, the agenda of which, surprisingly enough, did not include suppression of terrorism and WMD proliferation as key items. The leaders of the eight leading countries of the world had planned to approach such issues as the status of world economy, climatic change concerns, critical foreign policy problems, and the situation in Africa.

Great Britain (primarily Scotland) tensely anticipated possible clashes between police and antiglobalists. Mass media broadcast information on unprecedented security measures, which were to guarantee an untroubled annual G8 leaders summit. But trouble struck elsewhere - in London where the forces of law and order had been substantially slackened off at that point, and precisely on the day when the summit began. Hence the symbolic nature of this bloodshed is beyond doubt. Could the British police or intelligence have prevented those attacks? Unlikely, because suicidal terrorists have lately stuck to a tactic that makes it hard to imagine how, without an early warning, the London police and other British law machinery and intelligence could have prevented what happened on July 7 in London.

Therefore, the logic of a tough and terrible war on terrorism shattered the "peaceful" nature of the Summit agenda, making it impossible to set aside even for a short while the most critical challenge of today - the drastically increased threat of terrorism and extremism. The G8 leaders made a special statement on fighting terrorism, in which they emphatically condemned terrorist acts as crimes, reaffirmed their consolidated position rejecting any justification for mass murder of humans. The statement also included arrangements made for new joint G8 efforts to improve information exchange on terrorists' transborder movements, conducting assessments and seeking adequate responses to threats to the transportation infrastructure in order to assure railway and subway security. The London tragedy, according to the statement, has strengthened the determination of the G8 countries to come to terms on a universal convention against international terrorism as soon as possible.

The statement placed a major role with measures to prevent further involvement of a great number of people in terrorist activities. This item of anti-terrorist struggle is particularly critical for such European countries as Great Britain hosting a large Muslim community. Well, out of the four terrorists likely to have perpetrated the July 7 attacks in London, three are subjects of the Queen of Great Britain. As was written in the *International Herald Tribune* editorial for July 18, 2005, "Stricter border controls or pressure on foreign governments could not have stopped them. ... Their pathological hatreds were sown not in some desert madrasah but in rainy suburban West Yorkshire..." Terrorism recruits its fans among young people, which is identified by some Western commentators and experts as a "lost generation". This generation has been formed by children of that immigration wave from "third world" countries that responded to the want of common labour force that had emerged in 1960 - 1970s in Western Europe. Their treatment as inferior humans breeds disappointment in and hatred towards the Western society and Western values and makes part of them perceptive to the ideas promoted by such organizations as Al-Qaeda.

In the context of the London terrorist attacks, the G8 leaders made a special statement relating to non-proliferation problems during the summit in Gleneagles; however, it warrants thorough additional review.

It can all be summarized by saying that the urgency of curtailing the threat of international terrorism in the near future requires the world community not only (and probably not so much) to strengthen the measures already tried in one or another situation before, but rather to develop fundamentally new forms of cooperation based on a qualitatively new level of confidence between the leading countries and resulting in a much higher level of interaction and information exchange in responding to global challenges. Radical reduction of the threat of terrorism in a long-term perspective, however, is only possible on the path of philosophical rethinking of the world development tendencies, solving economic, international, interconfessional and other problems that yield a fertile field for intolerance and xenophobia, extremism and terrorism.

Editorial Team



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PROGRESS AND FINDINGS OF THE 2005 VII NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE

The 2000 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) concluded with the delegates exhilarated on account of consensus reached in the form of a commitment to “accomplish the total elimination of nuclear arsenals” through implementation of a Program of 13 practical steps.

Already the findings of the 2005 Conference Preparatory Committee First Session (2002) demonstrated lack of real grounds for expectations to achieve substantial nuclear disarmament progress. The U.S. clearly stated that the new President Bush administration (in power since 2001) no longer supports some of the 13 aforementioned steps, specifically, the Preparatory Commission for the ABM Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CNTBT).

Of an equally outcome were the findings of the 2003 Preparatory Committee’s second session – no constructive decision, but heightened discussions of North Korea’s decision on withdrawal from the Treaty, Iran’s nuclear program and development by the United States of new types of nuclear warheads (“bunker buster”). The emotions culminated in the Hiroshima mayor’s words that we are now teetering on the brink of hyper proliferation and, possibly, another use of nuclear weapons.

As the third session of the Preparatory Committee began in 2004, the general mood was far from elated. Nuclear-weapon States, the U.S. above all, emphasized that NPT priorities should focus on proliferation of nuclear weapons and that there were no problems in their compliance with the Treaty Article VI commitments. Non-nuclear-weapon States, however, underscored the opposite: proliferation of nuclear weapons will continue until nuclear-weapon States renounce the right to possess nuclear weapons and initiate large-scale negotiations on their elimination. The Chairman, Ambassador of Indonesia Mr. Sudjadnan Parnohadiningrat failed to introduce his summary of the discussion progress as an attachment to the PrepCom’s Summary document (due to the U.S. disagreement). Ambassador of Brazil Mr. S. Duarte, anticipating problems for himself as the President-Elect of the 2005 Review Conference, repeatedly emphasized the need to approve at least an agenda for the future Conference, yet his message went unanswered. The Preparatory Committee’s work ended in a failure.

The 2005 VII NPT Review Conference was held 2 - 27 May in New York. The conference was convened pursuant to the Treaty Article VIII with a view to reviewing a number of urgent issues related to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, specifically, ways to assure comprehensive NPT compliance and its universality, supporting the process of reductions in nuclear weapons, strengthening of IAEA safeguards efficiency, provision of effective security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, etc.

The Conference was attended by over 150 NPT Member States, along with representatives of a number of international and regional governmental and non-governmental organizations, specifically: IAEA, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CNTBTO), and the European Commission. The Ukrainian delegation to the Conference was led by Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine I. Dolgov.

General debate

The general debate (2-6 May) was joined by 78 delegations and 10 Foreign Ministers; including Japan, Australia, Germany, Ireland, Malaysia, Sweden, Iran, and Kazakhstan. The



delegations were predominantly represented by Deputy Foreign Ministers or special representatives for disarmament issues.

The Conference was opened by the UN Secretary General K. Annan, calling upon the delegates to reach mutual understanding of the apparent reality - disarmament, non-proliferation and right of peaceful use of nuclear energy are equally vital elements of the NPT. He cautioned that the increasing gap between commitments under the Treaty and their actual implementation poses a palpable threat to the nuclear non-proliferation regime and warrants taking serious decisions.

Next spoke the IAEA Director General Mr. M. ElBaradei who identified the main threats to the regime since the previous Review Conference.

According to him, the world has undergone drastic changes over the last five years. Today's realities have brought back to life the threat of nuclear explosion - growing terrorism, development of clandestine nuclear programs by some countries, the emergence of a nuclear black market. These new threats, he stressed, are accompanied by a drop in confidence between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, a lasting policy of nuclear deterrence, exacerbation of regional crises in the Middle East and around PDRK.

Mr. M. ElBaradei emphasized the importance of a firm and irreversible nuclear disarmament process. Foreseeing the Conference results, the IAEA Director General said: "If we fail to act, the NPT framework may be the same in 2010, but the world certainly will be different. If recent history is any teacher, by 2010, would-be proliferators will continue to innovate, and sensitive nuclear technology will continue to spread. The arsenals of nuclear-weapon States will continue to be modernized. And extremist groups will continue their hunt to acquire and use a nuclear explosive device - or, even worse, succeed."

In his statement, the Chairman of the Ukrainian Delegation reaffirmed Ukraine's commitment to the objectives of the Treaty as a pillar of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and pillars of nuclear disarmament, and underscored the need to assure strict compliance with its provisions and unequivocal compliance with the decisions of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. Having reminded of the celebration in 2004 of the 10th anniversary of our State's accession to the NPT, I. Dolgov emphasized that Ukraine's landmark decision to forswear its world third largest nuclear arsenal has been crucial for the progress in the nuclear disarmament. To meet the current challenges faced by the NPT-based regime the world community, as the Ukrainian Delegation Chairman said, should fully employ existing legal and institutional mechanisms, first of all the UN machinery and explore new ways to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons, related materials, equipment and technology. In this regard, Ukraine appreciates and supports significant potential of the new initiatives - the Security Proliferation Initiative and the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. The Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine emphasized that the primary objective for the Conference is to reaffirm the importance of the NPT as the focal element of maintaining peace and security worldwide and invited to seek effective mechanisms of its strengthening.

The general debate findings evidenced the following:

- among the three fundamental pillars of the NPT (non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy), the U.S. prioritizes non-proliferation issues: nuclear disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy for developing countries (Non-Aligned Movement) and non-proliferation in the context of assurance of peaceful use of nuclear energy for EU countries;
- all delegations voted for NPT universalization, strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and taking action to strengthen the Treaty. However, the ideas on ways to achieve this goal remain different. The first one (upheld by NAM countries) - implementation of complete

disarmament, compliance with all required procedures including strengthening of verification and monitoring activities to assure peaceful use of nuclear energy and prevent its diversion to military ends. The second one (upheld by the U.S., partially by EU) - strengthening of those NPT mechanisms, which provide for consideration of issues and making decisions on Treaty compliance and taking efficient measures against its violators;

- the situation with Iran's nuclear activities was appraised with criticism, but in a moderate fashion. The sharpest criticism was articulated by the U.S.;
- all delegations unanimously disapproved of PDRK's activities as regards the NPT, urged this country to resume the cooperation with IAEA and suspend its nuclear military program;
- delegations appreciated Libya's position as regards the NPT and welcomed the WMD non-proliferation steps the country took;
- general support was reaffirmed to the idea of strengthening of the IAEA's verification functions and universality assurance for the Protocol Additional to the IAEA Safeguards Agreements, which must be considered as a requirement for countries to gain access nuclear technologies (according to a large number of delegations, the said proposals constitute one of the practical outcomes of the Review Conference);
- countries are interested in further and more detailed review of potential IAEA mediatorship in supplying nuclear fuel for reactors to terminate any further construction of enrichment facilities;
- most delegations, EU countries above all, noted positive potential of the U.S. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), although NAM States did not accord total support and approval thereof;
- general support was expressed with respect to the UN SC Resolution 1540, while several delegations underpinned the importance of using a multilateral approach to its implementation issues.

The main emphasis of the U.S. position was laid on non-proliferation issues (general aspects of strengthening cooperation between countries and support to U.S. key initiatives). Emphasized was the need to review certain countries' compliance with the NPT provisions and taking practical measures against violators, specifically, blocking access to nuclear technologies. The primary focus of criticism was on Iran's nuclear activities. This approach was partially supported by Great Britain. The U.S. encouraged India, Israel and Pakistan, which remain beyond the Treaty, to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear countries.

Delegations from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries stood for the need to achieve real progress in nuclear disarmament above all (the main message was: no WMD - no proliferation thereof) and assurance of uninhibited access to nuclear technologies for peaceful uses.

The steps taken by nuclear countries with respect to disarmament and facilitation of development and exchange of nuclear technologies for peaceful uses were assessed as inefficient and insufficient. It was emphasized that disarmament progress must be more substantive and better prioritized; nuclear disarmament must be irreversible and controlled. A major concern was articulated about the growing tendency of military doctrines to refer to nuclear weapons as the main security factor, as well as steps taken by some nuclear-weapon countries (above all the U.S.) towards qualitative improvement of weapons.

Developing countries support measures against illegal proliferation of nuclear technologies, but not at the expense of narrowing their potential peaceful use. NAM spoke against the existing misbalanced and selective approach to NPT implementation issues, specifically, against shifting the focus from disarmament onto non-proliferation alone.

Iran, as an NAM participant, seconded the criticism expressed by the NAM countries and made extensive use of it to ground the country's position. The Iran side explicitly reaffirmed its resolve, despite existing challenges and external pressure, to continue developing

peaceful nuclear energy, including comprehensive use of all required nuclear cycle elements including enrichment. Iran's rationale for its position referred to the right to uninhibited use of nuclear technologies, envisaged in the NPT Article IV. Sharp criticism went to Israel for refusing from cooperation with IAEA and active efforts towards procurement of nuclear technologies from other countries. The issue of "negative" assurances on the part of nuclear-weapon countries is a priority for Iran.

EU took the most balanced view of the NPT compliance review and presented its position at the Conference in the form of 43 items. The moot point - disarmament and non-proliferation are mutually strengthening and mutually supplementary processes and must go in parallel to progress in both areas. All countries should strictly comply with the NPT provisions and, given facts of violations known to the IAEA, - be held accountable, including that through the UN SC. Non-proliferation remains an urgent NPT issue up to this point. Leading EU countries reaffirmed their determination to continue the political dialogue with Iran in order to more thoroughly elucidate the nature of its nuclear program. EU called upon States not party to the NPT (India, Israel and Pakistan) to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon countries.

Other delegations generally abode by one of the three aforementioned approaches.

Most speakers avoided making straightforward and harsh assessments of Iran's moves, encouraging this country to be fully open to the IAEA and continue negotiations.

Among specific statements, noteworthy was Canada's proposal to change the form of the NPT review process and on reschedule it to the annual basis with regular reporting on compliance with all Treaty articles.

Organization

The NPT Review Conference started without an approved agenda. Formally, it was Egypt alone that opposed to the Chairman's proposals.

Egypt's (active NAM participant) position referred to the need of a more comprehensive analysis of NPT compliance, primarily of the main resolutions and findings of the previous 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. According to Egypt's delegation, it will make it possible to evaluate disarmament progress in nuclear-weapon countries and initiate a substantive discussion of creating a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

The course of the debate evidenced the existence of deep contradictions at various levels on issues that the delegations were supposed to focus on. The main contradictions included those with respect to prioritizing NPT-related issues of concern (disarmament or non-proliferation); variance in viewing Iran's nuclear program (the U.S. insisted on identifying Iran as a violator of the NPT, other countries articulated criticism, but in a moderate fashion); conflicting views of "negative" security assurances (NAM favored the priority review and approval of such a document; nuclear-weapon countries demonstrated a careful approach); variance regarding nuclear disarmament status assessment (NAM favored an active review and taking practical steps, while nuclear-weapon countries demonstrated moderation).

The contradictions in the positions of the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States' delegations made for a delayed approval of the Conference agenda (at the 19th Plenary Meeting on May 18) and the decision to set up subsidiary bodies within three Main Committees, which deferred its activities for a few days.

The Conference resolved to establish:

- Subsidiary body 1 under Main Committee 1 to deal with nuclear disarmament and security assurances;
- Subsidiary body 2 under Main Committee 2 to deal with nuclear non-proliferation and regional issues;
- Subsidiary body 2 under Main Committee 2 to deal with peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Findings of the Main Committees

Despite the variance in the positions upheld by the delegations, the course of the debate was indicative of consensus reached among Conference participants on the NPT's key instrumentality as the basis for the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and a tool in maintaining international peace, security and stability.

Unity of views was manifest as to the need to take effective measures for strengthening of the Treaty and assurance of its universality. The emphasis was on urgency of measures in response to non-compliance/violation of the Treaty provisions and required prevention of withdrawal from it, improving efficiency of the IAEA safeguards system and strict compliance with the guidelines of multilateral export control regimes, soonest possible entry into force of the CNTBT, resuming negotiations under the Disarmament Conference to culminate in concluding a multilateral non-discriminative agreement on banning the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons.

Delegations of a number of countries (including Ukraine) emphasized the importance of considering the issue of nuclear-weapon States providing legally binding security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, and the need for further development of disarmament and non-proliferation related education.

The nuclear disarmament discussion issues demonstrated divergence in assessments by nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States of the progress made in reductions of nuclear weapons as well as in their visions of times and ways of implementation of further nuclear disarmament efforts. The delegations representing the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) States and the New Agenda Coalition (NAC: Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden) criticized the performance by the Nuclear Five of the 13 steps set out in the 2000 Review Conference Final Document, which identified specific nuclear disarmament activities.

Traditionally ambiguous judgments were passed regarding the U.S.- Russia START Treaty. The conclusion of the Treaty was identified as a positive step, but the lack of verification requirements and a provision on irreversibility of reduction of deployed nuclear weapons questions, as most countries believe, its effectiveness. In this regard, the U.S. and RF were urged to demonstrate a practical willingness to reduce their nuclear arsenals in compliance with the principles of irreversibility and effective verification. The NAM Countries reaffirmed their belief that nuclear-weapon States need to come up with a clear plan for reductions in nuclear weapons, speaking in favor of creating a special body within the Conference to deal with nuclear disarmament issues.

The Chinese delegation emphasized that it is an integral part of nuclear disarmament that nuclear-weapon States (the U.S.) obligatorily return their nuclear potential deployed beyond their borders to their national territories, along with elimination of the associated infrastructure.

The Nuclear Five informed the participants on practical nuclear disarmament steps taken since the previous Review Conference.

The U.S. emphatically rejected the calls for setting any timeframes for nuclear disarmament, underscoring the validity of the inalienable right to independently determine the pace and procedures for reducing nuclear arsenals.

Delegations of NAM States emphasized that nuclear-weapon States should forego the leading role of nuclear weapons in their defense doctrines. It was noted that such a step, along with ending the development of new types of nuclear weapons, will effectively facilitate progress in strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

A number of delegations, including Ukraine, underscored the need to pay due attention to the subject of reductions in non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW), encouraging the Nuclear

Five to start negotiating a legally binding and verifiable agreement to assure maximum possible and controlled reduction of these weapons. Ukraine, Sweden and Austria presented a joint working document that contained specific NSNW reduction proposals.

Many speakers called upon nuclear-weapon States to extend effective security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. NAM and NAC States spoke in favor of developing and concluding a legally binding document on the subject. Delegations of Great Britain and France exhibited a moderate treatment of the issue. The U.S. representative emphasized that, considering the growing threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons and material and the failure to some countries (above all, Iran) to meet its obligations under the NPT, the United States is not contemplating enhancement and deepening of its security assurances.

The EU, NAM and NAC States noted the extraordinary significance of CNTBT in terms of suppressing proliferation of nuclear weapons and called upon other States, the U.S. and China above all, (their ratification of the document is a mandatory prerequisite to its entry into force) to do it as soon as possible. The U.S. delegation reiterated once again the position upheld by the Bush Administration regarding this Treaty: the U.S. does not intend to become party to the CNTBT, yet it will continue to abide by the 1992 moratorium on nuclear weapon tests.

The participants unanimously underscored the important role played by IAEA safeguards in assuring that parties to the Treaty meet their non-proliferation obligations, especially in light of the modern security threats. Special attention was accorded to Protocols Additional (PA) to the IAEA Safeguards Agreements. The Nuclear Five and EU countries called upon other States to sign and ratify this document without delay. It was emphasized that for a State to have a valid Protocol Additional should be made a requirement to be met in order for any transfers of nuclear material and equipment by the Nuclear Suppliers Group members to take place. Ukraine informed on implementation of domestic procedures to assure the PA's entry into force.

Delegations of the U.S., Great Britain and France emphasized the significance of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and initiatives of the Global Partnership against Proliferation of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction in the context of responding to the modern challenges and threats and pointed to the urgency of their development and practical implementation. Explicit and sharp criticism traditionally went to the PSI from the Cuban delegation.

The PDRK situation continued to be a subject for discussion. The statements contained appeals to the country's leadership to reconsider the decision to withdraw from the NPT and quit the existing nuclear program. It is commonly believed that the PDRK crisis must be solved by peaceful means alone. The U.S. reiterated their position that the North Korea crisis should be settled via diplomatic efforts under the six-party talks.

Iran's compliance with its nuclear non-proliferation obligations was the subject of a highly emotional debate. Extensive attention was rendered to the Iran problem by the U.S. representatives, who straightforwardly and emphatically blamed the leadership of this country for violating the main provisions of the NPT. Traditional was the assumption that Iran, under the disguise of a peaceful nuclear program, is developing capabilities for nuclear weapons production. Emphasized was the need for Iran to provide IAEA inspectors with total access to all facilities as set forth in the PA and to assure total transparency of the national nuclear program.

The EU countries' statements were less harsh and reduced to calling upon Iran to assure full-scale cooperation with IAEA in the spirit of transparency.

In response to the U.S. charges, Iran pointed out that the State does not seek to acquire nuclear weapons, and the U.S. charges have nothing in common with reality and are contrary to the findings of IAEA reports and resolutions.

Most countries (including the U.S.) were unanimous in calling upon Israel, India and Pakistan to accede to the NPT, have their nuclear facilities IAEA-safeguarded, sign and ratify the CNTBT.

The Conference paid key attention to the subject of peaceful use of nuclear energy. In the course of the discussion all (both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon) countries reaffirmed the inalienable right of all countries to peaceful use of nuclear technologies and restated their willingness to carry on with due implementation of the NPT Article IV. Delegations informed on the status of nuclear energy industries in their countries and their contributions under IAEA technical cooperation programs.

Along with that, the U.S. (and, in part, Great Britain) made the right to peaceful use strictly dependent on compliance with non-proliferation requirements. The U.S. delegation underscored the generally limited nature of the countries' right to peaceful use of nuclear technologies, as envisaged in the NPT Article IV, and proposed to divest countries of the right to peaceful use should doubts arise in the civil character of nuclear activities and non-compliance with the NPT non-proliferation provisions. It primarily concerned Iran's and PDRK's activities.

The EU Countries generally acknowledged the importance of considering the status of compliance with non-proliferation commitments in the context of exercising the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy. The EU specifically emphasized the importance of compliance with procedures for identifying a country as a violator of the NPT to result in suspending the nuclear-weapon cooperation with it. Once the violator country meets all non-proliferation requirements, the cooperation can be resumed.

Together with the U.S. and Great Britain, Russia persistently tried to convince other parties to the NPT that enrichment activities do not make sense anymore, given the existing saturated enough nuclear fuel market available to non-nuclear-weapon countries. The aforementioned countries vindicated the urgency of active consideration of extending assurances to countries regarding nuclear fuel supplies and renunciation of other countries of the full nuclear cycle.

The Chinese delegation did not exhibit active involvement in the discussion of the issues above.

Unlike nuclear-weapon countries; other parties to the NPT, NAM countries above all, opposed to restricting the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy and technologies, including that under the pretext of suppressing proliferation, as well as to limited interpretation of Article IV of the NPT and nuclear-weapon countries' intent to link peaceful use with non-proliferation alone. Developing countries supported the measures to counter illicit proliferation of nuclear technologies, but not at the expense of narrowing peaceful use possibilities. The steps taken by nuclear-weapon countries to facilitate the peaceful use of nuclear technologies by non-nuclear-weapon countries were identified as inefficient and insufficient.

Little enthusiasm was expressed by NAM with respect to the idea of guaranteed nuclear fuel supplies in exchange for suspension of full nuclear cycle development. Such an approach was identified as ill-balanced. Reference was made to the lack of guarantees of steady supplies, the potential for using the supplies mechanism as a factor of political influence, the fact that such a mechanism is economically detrimental and politically objectionable for several countries, and to the existing threat to national energy security. The most active involvement in this subject on the part of NAM was undertaken by the delegations of Egypt, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brazil, Cuba, South Africa, and Iran.

As NPT Article X, on withdrawal from the Treaty, was discussed, propositions were put forward by EU, U.S., New Zealand and Australia. The delegations mentioned noted the importance of setting up such a mechanism that would urge countries to reconsider the idea of

withdrawal from with NPT, and, in the event of withdrawal, would limit nuclear-weapon cooperation with it. The propositions recognized that countries reserved the right to withdraw from the NPT, but they provided quite stringent conditions to limit the implementation of such a decision. Specifically, it was proposed to retain IAEA control over the country's peaceful nuclear activities countries, as well as to require the nuclear equipment and technologies to be returned to the exporter countries. In the U.S. opinion, exercising the right to withdraw from the NPT must give good reason to other countries to consider the consequences of such withdrawal for their national security. Withdrawal from the NPT should necessarily invoke a response from the UN SC.

The propositions did not meet full support on the part of developing countries. NAM countries admitted in the course of discussion that withdrawal from the NPT is politically objectionable and countries should not pursue it, yet the NPT is an international agreement that provides for the possibility of such a move. Withdrawal from the NPT must entail negative political consequences, but not a total isolation of the country in the area of peaceful nuclear activities.

In discussing the subject of withdrawal from the NPT, delegations plunged into a heightened debate over mechanisms and conditions of withdrawal as well as the order of priority for reviewing this subject by relevant international institutions and fora (IAEA, UN SC, and the Review Conference). In the dominant opinion of the majority of NAM countries, the subject of withdrawal from the Treaty should undergo early treatment of the IAEA and not automatically entail UN SC sanctions.

Conference Outcomes

The Review Conference failed to result in a successful outcome of its progress. The lack of consensus on the findings of the three Main Committees and subsidiary bodies was reflected in the content of related statements containing nothing but organizational provisions and listings of working documents disseminated by the States. The Conference Summary Document came to encompass the same content.

Ukraine co-authored two working documents of the Conference: one on non-strategic nuclear weapons (developed by Sweden and supported by Austria) and another on the subject of multilateral principles for nuclear supplies by the Zangger Committee (presented by countries parties to the Committee). Ukraine also disseminated the national report of compliance with the NPT Article VI as an official Conference document.

In its closing session statement, the Ukrainian delegation seconded the negative judgment passed by most participants regarding the Conference outcomes. It was emphasized that this Review Conference's failure is unacceptable for Ukraine - a State that once made an essential contribution to the cause of nuclear disarmament and was instrumental to the success of the 1995 Review Conference. In addition, it was stated that Ukraine would continue to be committed to the NPT objectives and pursue diligent efforts towards strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

The Review Conference practically failed to fulfill its mandate for development of specific recommendations on critical issues. Polar extremities in States' positions and the lack of consensus on fundamental issues made the Summary Document a mere facts summary by the Chairman.

P.S. According to official data, the 2005 NPT Review Conference cost USD 3 million- as the UN Deputy Secretary General N. Abe put it, "three Cadillacs per day" (3x\$50,000x20).

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NEW DIMENSIONS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

In no other region of the world have security issues ever been (nor are nowadays) an object of such a difficult struggle and such multipronged cooperation as in Europe. The continent used to be a leader in manpower, scale, and brutality of wars and conflicts. The situation in Europe has always been decisive for the course of world events and the level of global stability. It was Europe that was the arena of immediate confrontation between the Eastern and Western military blocs, which distorted inter-State relations and over time benefited most from the détente of international tension. Over the last two decades the continent has eventually undergone deep geopolitical transformations that have qualitatively changed the cornerstones, on which the security system has to be built.

Despite the end of confrontation and radical developments in the East, Europe has not achieved unity. Modern Europe has inherited the old tools of international security assurance while new ones continue to emerge and improve. They are being used in parallel, complementary to each other, but their interface is not very efficient. Based on the integration processes, most countries of the continent form an autonomous security system. The rest still lack lucid and attractive prospects.

Shortcomings of Inherited Security Mechanisms

Security problems in Europe are hadled by several international organizations and inter-State entities. Formally, the palm of supremacy must be conferred upon the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which incorporates all the nations of the continent, including the CIS countries as well as the U.S. and Canada. It was OSCE that once set up a format universally suitable for reviewing European issues: States parties to the North Atlantic Alliance and Warsaw Pact plus neutral States. Its fundamental documents are the Final Act adopted in 1975 in Helsinki and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe with a Supplementary Document adopted in Paris in 1990. An important role is also played by "Time of Change Challenge" Declaration, package of decisions on the structure and areas of the Organization's activity as adopted in 1992 in Helsinki, Lisbon Declaration on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century.

Of a milestone significance for improvement of the OSCE's security role was the adoption of the Charter for European Security, Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, a new revision of the Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security- Building Measures adopted at the 18-19 November 1999 Istanbul Summit of State and governmental leaders of OSCE Member States. The OSCE Member States emphatically spoke for prevention of the threat of force or use of force against territorial integrity, sovereignty, and political independence of any State and committed, if this may occur, to promptly respond both in terms of assistance to the victimized State and taking action as necessary against the Aggressor State. Significant is the role of OSCE in the stabilization of the situation in such regions and countries as Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Albania, Georgia, Pridnestrovye, Nagorny Karabakh, and Chechnya.



OSCE plays a major part in preventive diplomacy and peace-making. OSCE missions are the key instrument for prevention and settlement of conflicts. Missions are designed to establish a political dialogue with conflicting parties, identify and reduce sources of tension, and create political prerequisites for crisis settlement based on new principles and specific OSCE decisions. Missions are also intended to monitor tension areas in international relations. Since 1994, long-term missions have worked in Kosovo, Sandjak and Voevodina, Macedonia, Georgia, Moldova, Tadjikistan, Estonia, Latvia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia. Certain good prospects can be associated with the Conflict Prevention Centre (body of the OSCE Council of Ministers), designed to carry out military consulting and cooperation, information exchange, communication network development, liaison on issues of dangerous military incidents.

OSCE's effectiveness in modern Europe can not be high enough, however. The organization is incapable of exhibiting sufficient flexibility and promptness now that it is no sure task to reach an agreement between positions of States with different social orders and different notions of security requirements and norms. The Member States include both NATO members and outspoken adversaries of this organization. It makes itself felt that the possibility of assuring the implementation of agreements reached is limited. OSCE partakes of most shortcomings inherent in the UN. Under such conditions it has actually become an auxiliary means of security assurance and retains the single essentially important function - legitimization of action in the event a compromise is reached.

Over the last fifteen years NATO's role in the European continent security assurance has sizeably increased. This is primarily due due to accession of Eastern and South-Eastern European States to the Alliance. Currently the Alliance has cooperation programs with an absolute majority of countries on the continent, including post-Soviet ones. Through development of a special partnership with Russia and Ukraine, its activities cover almost the entire OSCE zone.

It is understandable that NATO's ability to affect the security status on the continent overall is limited. At the same time it is through cooperation with the Alliance that legal norms and civilized political practices are promoted, which have an immediate bearing on strengthening of stability and security. Specifically, the largest-scale Partnership for Peace program provides for improved transparency of military planning, States' military budget estimating, and assurance of democratic control over national armed forces.

The concurrent geopolitical realities inhibit NATO's transformation into a basic instrument of European security. Universalization, deideologization of activities, and perception of the Alliance appear to be major concerns. At this point, under the new geopolitical realities, it is not only the discrepancies between NATO and Russia that appear to be permanent, but also the lack of unity among the Alliance members on reforms and the level of its participation in force operations beyond the historical limits of responsibility. In addition, while the possibilities for enlargement eastward and development of cooperation are not exhausted yet, it is clearly obvious that neither an all-European status nor a consensus on the Organization's mandate will be reached. This circumstance has affected the development of integration processes, primarily the development of the European Union and emergence of new focuses in its activities.

Security to Boost Integration

Over three decades European integration developed almost exclusively in the domain of trade and economy. Already in the 1980s there were intensified attempts made to improve the coordination of European States' actions within the North Atlantic Alliance, there began development of cornerstones for common foreign policy and security policy in the EU format.



The Maastricht (1993) and Amsterdam (1997) Treaties established that common foreign and security policies are a “second pillar” (along with economic integration) of the European Union. The Amsterdam Treaty actually revitalized activities of the Western European Union (WEU) – the single entity that embodied the identity of European security. It was WEU that had developed the EU leadership-approved document *Preliminary Conclusions on the Formulation of a Common European Defence Policy*. In a similar manner principles were developed to be used by armed forces of EU/WEU countries to the benefit of European security.

During 2001 – 2002, WEU was fully incorporated into the system of EU bodies and institutions. Thus the European security and defense policy acquired better integrity and has further developed as a separate European Union activity.

THE MAIN OBJECTIVES OF THE COMMON EU FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY ARE:

- Upholding common values, fundamental interests, European Union’s independence and its immunity;
- Strengthening EU security;
- Facilitating international cooperation;
- Development and strengthening of democracy, establishment of the rule of law as a principle;
- Assurance of human rights and civil liberties;
- Defense policy and security policy implementation.

The European security and defense policy is an element supplementary to the common foreign and security policy. It envisages implementation of combat unit operations with a view to resolving conflicts and peace-making, operations to maintain peace, rescue missions, and humanitarian operations. The EU-established the so called “military consistency criterion” that provides for deployment within 60 days (and one-year maintainance) of a 60 thousand-strong military unit. This fact defines the militarization limits of the Union. It does not imply creating a European army; involvement of national military units in operations authorized by Brussels will depend on sovereign decisions by each Member State.

EU focuses its attention primarily on those security aspects that concern integration processes. And indeed, the increasingly closer relations in not only economic but also humanitarian and other areas must be supported with efforts aimed at assurance of stability, predictability, and manageability at the extranational level. In fact, an essentially new dimension of security is being formed within the European Union, which combines its national and international features and an appropriate approach to its assurance.

The Union pays special attention to civil aspects of conflict settlement. Specifically, it refers to law-enforcement agency activities, establishment of the rule of law, strengthening of civil administration and public defense.

The significance of EU’s security-related efforts is amplified by extending the associated approaches and activities onto the Union’s partners. Thus the New Neighbourhood Policy defining the Union’s common strategy with respect to Eastern European and Mediterranean countries is underpinned by the following: “The European Union should aim to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood ... with whom the European Union enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative relations.” “... The Union’s capacity to provide security, stability and sustainable development to its citizens will no longer be distinguishable from its interest in close co-operation with the neighbours.”

The recent EU initiatives aimed at bringing order to relations with neighbouring States bear a paradigm to secure Europe from imported social-economic and humanitarian problems and destabilization risks, which may come from outside. In implementing the “Expanded Europe” concept, EU seeks to prevent appearance of new demarcation lines on the continent.

Brussels' objective is to set up a "circle of friends" around the enlarged Union. It is the target for frontier cooperation, facilitation of economic and social development of regions beyond the frontiers, implementation of regional projects. Similarly; poverty, environmental pollution, contraband, illicit trade, trafficking in narcotics, organized transborder crime, money laundering, trade in humans, and financial-economic crime are considered as serious risks to be eliminated. In addition, the level of dialogue and cooperation in counter-terrorist efforts is intended to be raised.

Security component is present in bilateral documents of specific States and the European Union itself. Thus the EU-Ukraine Action Plan is designed to facilitate stability, security and welfare assurance. The Plan priorities include development of capabilities for enhanced consultations between Ukraine and EU on crisis management; strengthening of cooperation in disarmament and non-proliferation nuclear weapons; strengthening of cooperation in common neighbourhood and regional security; specifically that related to developing an efficient plan for settlement of the Pridnestrovye conflict in Moldova, including resolution of the frontier issues.

EU takes the unquestionable lead in forming approaches to security issues and identifying means of its assurance. It is equally apparent that the Union has effective means in dealing with security issues given global peace and availability of general safeguards against strategic military threats. It builds a higher security while it is other factors that provide cornerstones for this construction, on which the Union has but a limited impact.

Multifaceted European Security

Priorities sought by the European community are established in the Statute of the Council of Europe; those include peace based on justice and international cooperation, as well as economic and social progress. The unification of Europe began in post-war years driven by the circumstances, in part, and served to prevent hostility and conflicts. Over centuries the continent demonstrated the highest intensivity of international contacts; including competition, rivalry, struggle, and wars. Similarly, it is the leader in cooperation and integration development. The idea to launch a policy that would eliminate hatred and mistrust between nations and create an atmosphere of tolerance and harmony was commonly accepted in the post-war period. And such policy took footing in common spiritual, intellectual, and political values.

Modern Europe demonstrates the potential for profound evolution of the role of the State in international affairs and foreign policy pillars. National interests do not lose significance, but their role is being adjusted. In fact, they are getting not only better harmonized, but also somewhat internationalized. The formation of collective identity and expanded applicability of common values bring forth a transition from compromise and tactical interaction, which are also common in the rest of the world regions, to implementation of a common strategy. The subject of this strategy consists in joint development modelling.

Hostility between nations in the inter-State format can be considered reliably ended and essentially overcome. Reconciliation between peoples of Europe, which were at a long-standing enmity, and making amends for the historical grievances have taken place. It is exemplified in the qualitative evolution of the France - Germany relations. Furthermore, prospects are realistic that, under impact of the new European political atmosphere, the same will happen in its entirety to the Ukraine - Poland, Croatia - Serbia, and Greece - Macedonia relations, and the Cyprus problem will be solved. In the domestic format, however, the issues of separatism, interethnic, and interconfessional conflicts remain a concern. For instance, the impact of the European community on the problems of Ulster, Catalonia or Corsica is but nominal.

Collective self-identification of Europe in the world, if at all possible, is most likely to remain quite contingent and vague. If we question – what is the difference between the notions of Europe and the West, is there a reason to distinguish between the phenomena of westernization and europeization, what characterizes a proper European position in the North-South relations, what is Europe's place in "The Golden Billion" and its treatment of related problems; we will find it extremely difficult to give a clear answer thereto. Europe's identity is practically not reflected in the interaction between transnational corporations and in such organizations as the G8.

Under these conditions it is obvious that sufficient security autonomy and security self-sufficiency cannot be achieved within the EU, let alone the continent in general. The operational experience of the Western European Union, implementation by the European Union of a separate European strategy indicates that Europe lacks security self-sufficiency. It certainly concerns military security as well as macroeconomic and energy-related security. In this connection, close interaction with NATO has no alternative up to now, and the pursuit of a "Greater Europe" structure with Russia's participation remains urgent.

"Greater Europe" does not have the potential to reach value-related and, therefore, geopolitical homogeneity. It will not be a simplification to state that security in the continent-wide format predominantly depends on the status of Europe/Russia relations and on development of Euro-atlantic partnership. It cannot be neglected that Europeism, on the one hand, got an impulse and even support from the U.S. in its rebirth and development after World War II, while, on the other hand, to a certain degree it was formed in opposition to the U.S. leadership role. Similarly, Western Europe's consolidation during a few post-war decades was induced by the threat from the East. Over the recent years the anti-Soviet sentiments have been in part transformed into anti-Russian ones. They have spread in post-Socialist countries as well.

The relations between the united Europe and Russia will retain elements of military-political rivalry. This circumstance, along with the world-wide dynamics in the balance of powers will determine a special role for the U.S. in European security. This was once again confirmed at the June 2005 EU/U.S. Summit. Development of EU/NATO interaction and their enlargement east of the continent are the main stability factors.

Over the last fifteen years or so, geopolitical coordinates have been mutually clarified between Europe, U.S. and Russia. Similar detail is developed for the systems of societal values, on which they are based. Difference among Europeans in their attitude to America has a noticeable but not too profound effect on the "Project Europe" content and functions. More complex problems have to be tackled in relations with Russia. On the one hand, a sound rationale is available for a Russian Europe to exist. Primarily it concerns the culture and historical links. For at least three centuries Russia experienced and at times even encouraged significant influence from Europe. But it did not become a truly European country.

A major independent role is played by the geopolitical factor. Russia undoubtedly aspires to the status of a power centre and competes with Europe in that respect. It is only natural that it assumes a peculiar position with respect to Europe and its advancement eastward. Russia does not seek to join that part of the European community that was formed and continuously improved by tens of countries of the continent. It goes as far as to even flaunt such a position and proposes instead an alternative option of European identity, objecting to application of European standards in assessing the situation in Eastern European states. Its intent to impede development of CIS Member States' European prospects is absolutely obvious. Different in nature and target between the two, but large involvement of the U.S. and Russia in European affairs affects the situation in the "Greater Europe". Primarily, it has an effect on distinguishing issues better manageable on the continental level from those requiring a different

format. It is most vividly manifest in security issues where the all-European format is inferior in applicability to both the global format involving great world powers and that specific regional one embodied by the European Union.

Yet Europeans do not abandon any of security assurance mechanisms and have reached maximum success in settling and precluding conflicts that have occurred on the continent. In this, Europe is an example for other regions of the world. It has practically implemented the famous maxim that one democracy cannot perpetrate aggression another democracy. The key to success here is the consensus reached among the political elite in understanding the content of national security and collective security and their implementation strategy. Besides, vigorous civil society institutions may prove more effective than State agencies in preventing such threats and destabilising factors as ethno national conflicts and manifestations of political extremism. Such standards are apparently achievable only within the area of established legal democracy, which actually is and will remain much narrower than the European area proper. Non-uniform societal development will determine in the near-term prospects the varying level of security in various parts of the continent. And this reality cannot be altered by any international treaties.



A LONG AND WINDING ROAD TO NATO

Step by step, Ukraine is approaching NATO. Yet the progress is slow. It is not only because part of the Alliance countries are quite skeptical about Kyiv's prospects of joining the organization. Nor because of the notorious Russian factor. The credit goes back to Ukraine itself where the political leadership declares its pursuit of euroatlantic integration, but has done little for its implementation thus far. Oftentimes the policy of joining NATO is made contingent on the course of domestic policy processes. Notwithstanding, despite the slowness and inconsistency, our country is very likely to become a member of this renowned transatlantic club soon.

Credit of Trust to the Orange Revolution

The Orange Revolution opened the door for Kyiv to the North Atlantic Alliance. And while our country's compliance in 2003 and 2004 with the action items set forth in the annual Target Plan sections was more or less a success, Brussels has always questioned domestic policy transformations in Ukraine. The presidential elections eventually demonstrated that Ukraine professes the values that are common to the transatlantic community. In turn, the Orange Revolution induced the Alliance to respond and send Ukraine a clear and unambiguous message as to its euroatlantic prospects. And it was already at the Vilnius NATO Summit in April that Kyiv launched an Intensified Dialogue with Brussels.

This step of the Alliance is a very important one for our country as it was the first time that all the twenty six members of this organization made a political decision on Ukraine's potential NATO membership. It does not, however, mean that Ukraine is a candidate nation. The Intensified Dialogue with Kyiv, covering a wide range of political, economic and security issues will be conducted by Brussels without any commitments made by the latter. This intent is emphatically specified in Paragraph 8 of the Madrid Declaration on EuroAtlantic Security and Cooperation.

Still, the Intensified Dialogue is the first official step towards membership, which befell the participants of the last two enlargement waves- Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Rumania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Czech Republic and Estonia. It should not escape our attention, however, that it once again involved a special approach to Kyiv. Now that it was an Intensified Dialogue on membership that the countries of Eastern and Central Europe held with NATO while Kyiv would approach Brussels within an Intensified Dialogue on Ukraine's pursuit of membership and associated reforms...

Such a title tells a story about what Ukraine has to do for a future entry into the Alliance. At this point, however, Kyiv is getting ready for a dialogue with Brussels on the subject of sensitive information including that classified "top secret" in Ukraine, because once our country has articulated its desire to join the Alliance its actions must be understandable, transparent and predictable to the organization members, including, by the way, such peculiar areas as cooperation between Ukrainian and Russian special services.

Ukraine and NATO will discuss these and other issues in the framework of the so called Preliminary Discussion Document transmitted to NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer during his June visit to Kyiv. Since, as stated in the eighth paragraph of the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement, that is still valid as the basis for all further enlargement effort, "Allies will want to know how possible new members intend to contribute to NATO's collective defense and will explore all aspects of this question in detail through bilateral dialogue".

As a rule, the longest that an Intensified Dialogue can last is a year. Then the country starts work under the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP), which is the key element preparatory to joining the organization. On the one hand, the program is the basis for the Alliance to track political, economic, defense, security, and legal progress made by candidate countries while, on the other hand, it is designed to make sure the Bloc is instrumental to these countries' preparation for potential membership. Nevertheless, as it is the case with the Intensified Dialogue, for countries to subscribe to a MAP does not guarantee that membership will become a reality.

As to Ukraine, the likelihood is high that Kyiv will be able to sign up for a MAP as soon as next spring and begin its implementation since September 1, 2006 in order to receive an official invitation to join NATO as early as in 2008. Yet it all depends on a few factors. First, on how the 2006 parliamentary elections will proceed; how free, upright and transparent they will be, on whether the new Ukrainian authorities will resist the temptation to abuse their administrative powers and pressure the media. In other words, whether Ukraine will once again demonstrate its willingness to comply with the criteria common for transatlantic community countries.

Second, the political reform factor should not be dismissed; its completion will vest the Prime Minister with foreign policy formation controls. Numerous NATO Member States believe that, should the elections be won by parties opponent to the current authorities, the Cabinet of Ministers they will form will thwart the Ukraine/NATO cooperation. And that makes them cautious about Kyiv's future entry into the MAP process. And third, much depends on whether the Viktor Yushchenko team's efforts in implementing declared political and economic reform will be a success.

"This (parliamentary elections. - V.V.) will be a test for us. If we wage a worthwhile campaign and if the pace of social and economic development follows the established lines, one may say that following the election of the new parliament, a schedule for NATO membership progress will be developed and milestones set on the path towards entering the EU", Defense Minister Anatoly Grytsenko recently said.

The need for economic and political transformations as a condition for further development of the dialogue between Kyiv and Brussels is also referred to by NATO's political leader. In an interview to *Dzerkalo Tyzhnia* weekly, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer unequivocally stated: "We as well as the Ukrainian government must concentrate on the attainment of the major goal - implementation of the relevant reforms. We cannot neglect it once we have started discussions of the time frames and bureaucratic procedures." (joining the MAP process. - V.V.)

The Ukraine/NATO Commission meeting at the ambassador level to be attended by Ukrainian Foreign Minister, which is scheduled for October, will represent the first milestone on our way to MAP. In the spring, representatives of the transatlantic organization will meet in the Ukrainian capital to review not only Kyiv's input to implementing the joint Ukraine/NATO measures under the 2005 Target Plan, but, above all, the Viktor Yushchenko team's performance in managing the reforms. It is written down in the 2005 Target Plan, by the way.

Pro? Contra? Undecided?

While the final decision on Ukraine's acceptance in NATO has yet to be approved, our country still has a major sponsorship where the key role is played by the United States and Poland.

Warsaw has been a consistent supporter of Kyiv's membership in the North Atlantic Alliance over the last decade. As to Washington, the White House, Department of State, Department of Defense and the Congress only recently formulated a consolidated position regarding our country. And it was the Orange Revolution that had played the key role: after the disappointment experienced by the Republican Administration in the Georgia of Mikhail

Saakashvili, it was Ukraine that became for George Bush, Jr. a proof of success of its democracy promotion policy worldwide.

Therefore, Washington is going to do its utmost to make sure Ukraine becomes a felicitous example of transformation of a post-Soviet and corruption-plagued country into a democratic nation with market economy integrated with the world's economy and Europe-oriented politically.

In this connection we may refer to the address of a group of influential U.S. politicians to G. Bush, Jr. with a challenge to play the leading role in our country's entry into the European Union and North Atlantic Alliance. As the authors believe (the authorship including ex-Secretaries of State Madeleine Albright, James Baker, and Henry Kissinger; former National Security Advisors Zbigniew Brzezinski, Frank Carlucci, and Brent Scowcroft along with the Center for Strategic and International Studies President John Hamre), security and prosperity of Ukraine will prove the possibility of a normal post-Communist future for Russia as well.

Kyiv should benefit from the current favorable situation. As time elapses the West feels an ever-mounting "Ukraine fatigue", turning to a growing skepticism about the new Ukrainian leadership's ability to implement economic, political and judicial reforms. The Orange Revolution euphoria is dwindling, giving way to criticism of the Yulia Tymoshenko government's performance bent on "manual" economy management techniques, and to disillusionment due to Viktor Yushchenko's inconsistency as regards Ukraine's participation in UES, fear of the possible reprivatization process, etc.

It is evidenced in the words of United States Ambassador to Ukraine John Herbst (which can be considered as a warning): the U.S. does not consider the joint George Bush/Viktor Yushchenko statement on willingness to streamline bilateral talks on Ukraine's accession to WTO in 2005 as a binding commitment. You may remember that on April 4 Viktor Yushchenko and George Bush, Jr. signed a joint statement in Washington on the United States support of Ukraine's pursuit of NATO membership and on willingness to streamline bilateral talks on Ukraine's accession to WTO in 2005.

"I know it has been common practice here – since the Soviet era – to maintain international relations on the basis of documents that reflect the commitments of both sides. In my view, this is a bit too formal. As for the document that was signed during the Washington visit, I would say it proclaims hopes and aspirations rather than commitments. Undoubtedly, we would like to see all the provisions of this document implemented, but we do not consider them binding", John Herbst said in an interview to *Den* newspaper.

Therefore, Kyiv must work in a serious and unswerving manner. And, of course, Ukrainian authorities should consistently deal with countries, which are skeptical about the prospects of Ukraine's NATO membership. This group is a small but influential one. In addition to three Mediterranean States – Italy, Spain and Portugal, it includes such leading European countries as Germany and France together with Belgium that follows lead of the French foreign policy.

The way positions of all skeptical countries are formed involves in one way or another Russian factor. Thus for Paris the relations with Moscow mean more than those with Kyiv: the Ukrainian-French commodity turnover stands no comparison with the Russian-French one while the Paris/Moscow political affinity has a long-standing history. The special terms Vladimir Putin and Gerhard Schröder are on is even the subject matter of popular jokes. The German government's position is also affected by the fact that Russian gas takes up to 40% of Germany's overall gas consumption balance. In addition, serious business relations with Russia are maintained by businessmen in Italy, Spain and Portugal. And that makes an impact on governmental policies of those Mediterranean countries...

Nevertheless, the situation is not as bad as it may seem at first sight. Implementation by the Viktor Yushchenko team of political, military and economic reforms and adaptation of Ukrainian legislation to the transatlantic community law can strip the entry opponents of their arguments. Besides, one should keep in mind that Paris has practically always adopted a moderate position when it concerned enlargement of the Alliance. But when the time came to make a decision, the French voted for acceptance of new members.

Yet it is Moscow's position that is much more alarming. The Russian highest political leadership – Vladimir Putin, Sergei Lavrov, Sergei Ivanov – repeatedly stated last year that selecting partners is a sovereign right of each State. Now that the Kremlin has retained its negative attitude to NATO enlargement until this point, such a public response of the Russian leadership is comforting. All the more that Kyiv's transatlantic partners repeatedly stress that Ukraine's integration into NATO should by means take place at the expense of deteriorated relations with Russia. But one should not be mistaken.

We risk assuming that the Russian leadership believes the Intensified Dialogue to be predominantly a declaration resulting from the Orange Revolution, while our country's accession to the Alliance – a matter of distant and almost unreal perspective. Hence the reaction of the Russian leadership. Yet the Kremlin is not inclined to rely on chance. While Moscow does not yet have efficient factors of personal influence on the current Ukrainian leadership, Russians are now using other means to obstruct our country's future accession to the North Atlantic Alliance.

Russian Ambitions

The system of security in Europe that is formed through NATO enlargement eastward cannot suit Russia, where political elites abide in their own world of memories and dreams of the past and future grandeur of the Russian State. During the last decade, Russian politicians have resisted to the process of NATO enlargement to accommodate former Socialist countries. For the Kremlin it is more desirable to shape up its own "pole" of power retaining Russian political, economic and military influence on post-Soviet countries. Yet new political realities force Moscow to adapt. Nowadays the Kremlin, as was once noted by former Ukrainian Defense Minister Kostyantyn Morozov, is using a "strategy of indirect action". It provides for Russia's joining political and military structures of the Alliance. On the one hand, it enables the Kremlin to affect the organization's policy development. On the other hand, it makes it possible to attempt to "transform the process of NATO enlargement eastward into a process of enlargement of the CIS collective security system westward".

This objective pursued by Moscow seems to have been achieved. Not only do Russians interact with the Bloc under the "Partnership for Peace" program. Being involved in the NATO-Russia Council, the Kremlin develops joint Alliance decisions together with twenty six countries. This fact, however, need not be overestimated. As Alliance representatives say, Moscow is able to impact defense-related decision-making, and by no means that security-related. It means that in reality Russia has no impact on the organization's strategic decision-making. This primarily concerns the enlargement eastward.

Western diplomats repeatedly remind that despite the Russian opposition, NATO enlargement eastward has taken place and nine countries of Central and Eastern Europe have become members of this political-military club. "The Russian factor is important but everything depends on us alone", is the summary of their comments with respect to Moscow's impact on Kyiv's choice. Nevertheless, to underestimate the Russian factor would be a great mistake. The significance of Ukraine to Moscow is incomparable to that of Central European countries, Lithuania, Latvia or Estonia. And while Russian politicians seem to have come to live with the

thought that Ukraine will join NATO in a few years, Moscow still has enough means to thwart the plans of the Ukrainian leadership.

Now Russians act differently from the way they did ten years ago, when the membership issue was first raised with respect to Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. In 2005 the Kremlin prefers roundabout action to straightforward, using skeptical countries from within NATO. And the new presidential team, by its ill-considered moves in economy and domestic policy, extremely facilitates the Russian cause.

Russia is actively working within Ukraine itself, where it has serious controls-economic, energy, information, and lobbyist. Exploiting them, the Kremlin opposes to the political dialogue between Kyiv and the Alliance and practical NATO-Ukraine cooperation, tries to take maximum advantage of the indecision and mistakes of Ukrainian leadership. Besides, Russians are wasting no time in expanding the basis for the pro-Russian lobby in Ukraine. Also involved are politicians representing parties opponent to the current authorities, the former being traditionally identified as pro-Russian: the Communist Party, the Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine (united), and the Party of Regions.

And, of course, Russians will not abandon attempts to capitalize on those high-ranking Ukrainian officials that have business interests in Russia. Playing on weak spots of Viktor Yushchenko, Yuliya Tymoshenko, Petro Poroshenko, Anatoly Kinakh, and Oleksandr Zinchenko along with taking advantage of the tension between them; Moscow will attempt to reach concessions in areas that seem to be of little meaning for the Ukraine/NATO relations, but notably affect Kyiv's accession to the Transatlantic Club.

Far from the least is the role scripted for big Russian companies working at the Ukrainian market: according to the new Russian strategy, they have to pursue the Kremlin's interests in the CIS countries. No attention is spared to the management of those Ukrainian companies, which have long-standing and close cooperation ties with Russian companies and have failed to expand their product sales market over the years of Ukrainian independence. It is them that are the target of the Russian leadership's recent statements on the prospects of Russia-Ukraine defense industry complex (DIC) cooperation.

Already at this point Russian politicians claim that Ukraine's accession to the Alliance will affect the Russia-Ukraine military-technical cooperation (MTC), since it would be unsafe for Russia to locate high-technology production within the territory of a state that is about to integrate into NATO. RF Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov says that Russia will undertake to incur additional costs to set up closed production cycles for key weapons and military equipment and forego its dependence on Ukrainian supplies.

At the recent roundtable "DIC of Ukraine: between NATO and RF" Advisor Delegate of the Russian Embassy to Ukraine Evgeny Pantelev said in the context of the Kremlin's statements, that development of Ukraine/Russia defense industry cooperation would be contingent upon the nature of relations within the Ukraine - RF -NATO triangle. "If it happens so that the strategic relations between RF and NATO - at the moment when Ukraine's strategic foreign policy objective to join NATO will have been achieved- will be equally friendly within the Ukraine-RF-NATO triangle, it is quite likely that both trilateral and any bilateral military-industrial complex (MIC) projects will be welcome and effective", said the diplomat. "But if such cooperation is not equally effective at the political level, then, of course, the political impact of the "imperfect situation" will affect the DIC", noted Evgeny Pantelev. And continued: "For how hard we should be willing to dismiss political aspects, the destiny and prospects of joint RF/Ukraine DIC projects will be dependent on them". Based on the statements of the Russian side, opponents to the Ukrainian euroatlantic integration-oriented policy conclude that our State's accession to NATO will have a negative impact on its MIC.

Prospects of the Ukrainian DIC



In order to realize what impact Ukraine's accession to NATO will have on Ukrainian DIC, a few words should be said about the current status of the Ukrainian and Russian defense industries. The thing is that since early 1990s the Russian leadership has been pursuing a consistent policy of separating the Russian DIC from its Ukrainian counterpart and creating closed production cycles throughout the country for virtually all types of equipment and armaments. This policy, launched even before Kyiv adopted the decision to join NATO, will be implemented by Russians regardless of our country being a member of the Alliance.

A fundamentally different position was assumed by Kyiv. Over the last fourteen years it has pursued a policy of preserving the remnants of the Soviet military-industrial complex and producing, in cooperation with Russians, parts for military goods whose production process is finalized in Russia. Over this period only a few Ukrainian DIC industries have been able to create closed production cycles for some types of goods, including armored vehicles, military transport aircraft, air-to-air missiles, ships of the "Korvet" and "Fregat" class, means of radioelectronic intelligence, and radioelectronic warfare. By the way, some enterprises, in manufacturing such products, have had experience of military-technical cooperation with Alliance Member States in the past.

Meanwhile, a number of enterprises producing parts for military goods continue, as was mentioned above, to rely on the Russian market. It is those enterprises that will be most affected by Russia's suspension of military-technical cooperation (MTC) with Ukraine.

Still, according to Ukrainian experts - the Head of the Center for Euroatlantic Integration Volodymyr Gorbulin for example - MTC cooperation with the Alliance will improve performance characteristics of Ukrainian products in several areas. In addition, the adoption of NATO standards will diversify the sales market. As to the prospects of Ukraine/NATO MTC cooperation, it would be worthwhile to quote former Defense Minister Oleksandr Kuzmuk. He states that for NATO it is not an issue what country should produce military equipment. The bottom-line is to make sure it complies with the required standards and is capable of coping with the set tasks. "Today we are primarily talking about management systems and logistics, so that any type of equipment would be provided, maintained, and capable of completing the required tasks", ex-Defense Minister believes.

Alliance representatives, in turn, say that Ukraine's Euroatlantic ambitions are no obstacle to the Ukraine/Russia MTC. "There exists no more than 15% of strategic systems that NATO Member States prefer purchasing from Western manufactureres, the remaining 85% is weapons and military equipment, which can be procured outside of the Alliance", NATO's Kyiv Information and Documentation Center Michel Duray was quoted as saying by the Defense Express agency. In this connection there is no need to oppose Ukraine's progress towards NATO to military-technical cooperation with RF.

"In the long term, I cannot imagine a situation in which a closer cooperation of Ukraine with the Alliance can have a negative effect on the Ukrainian defense industry. At the same time, one can expect that new and profitable markets will open to Ukraine and it will find new opportunities of participation in joint projects with the industrial representatives of European and North American countries", the NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer told the *Dzerkalo Tyzhnia* weekly.

According to him, "the Alliance utilizes Ukrainian transport aviation on a contractual basis, while an increase of the level of operational interoperability of military equipment and armed forces of the Alliance and Ukraine has been the priority task of our common activities in the sphere of defense reform for the last seven years. I must also say that operational interoperability does not mean that the whole of military equipment used in multinational operations must be produced by a specific company or a state".

These are arguments that Ukrainian authorities should use to convince Ukrainians in the benefits of the country's accession to NATO, freeing them from cold war prejudices and stereotypes.

Why Is Ukraine Headed for the Alliance?

And, finally, what is the reason for Ukraine to join NATO? What benefits would an average Ukrainian have from his or her country's membership in the North Atlantic Alliance? These questions need to be discussed and explained today. Thus far, however, the new Ukrainian authorities have been doing nothing of the kind despite its representatives' declarations of commitment to euroatlantic integration and the need to bring Ukrainians up-to-date accordingly. And it is sad as there are no grounds to question the candor of Viktor Yushchenko as the country's political leader. Those mistakes made by the establishment are being actively exploited by opponents to Ukraine's accession to NATO while they continue to resort to anti-American and anti-West rhetoric.

Opinion polls demonstrate that many Ukrainian citizens still believe NATO to be an aggressive bloc. According to the data collected by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) and the Razumkov Center in May 2005, Ukraine's accession to NATO was supported by 22.1% of respondents only, while 55.7% objected. And back in June 2002, the number of supporters to Ukraine's accession to NATO was 32%, with some surveys yielding a number up to 37%! Yet a positive trend is still there, since back in February 2005, according to the Democratic Initiatives Fund and KIIS polls, only 14.9% of our citizens voted for our country's accession to the Alliance while 47.5% Ukrainians objected.

A sharp slump in support to the euroatlantic intergration-oriented policy occurred for a number of reasons. Firstly, although the Leonid Kuchma administration declared a policy of joining NATO, in practice it has discredited this policy in every way possible. One should only recall that the presidential campaign for the pro-authority candidate was run under anti-West and anti-American mottos. Secondly, most Ukrainians associate NATO with the United States, forgetting that the Alliance also includes nineteen members of the European Union. The drastic drop of the Alliance's popularity in Ukraine began in the spring of 2003, when the United States and Great Britain launched a military campaign against the Iraq of Saddam Hussein. And, of course, the cold war stereotypes play a major role.

Another reason for low support to the euroatlantic integration-oriented policy is that the current Ukrainian authorities are slow in intensifying the information and elucidation policy most likely for fear of losing potential votes in the parliamentary elections. Still, the Presidential team should not associate euroatlantic integration-oriented policy with the risk of losing votes in the parliamentary elections: foreign policy priorities have never been determinant for Ukrainian voters.

As exemplified in the experience of Central and Eastern European countries, today is the time that Ukrainian citizens should be told that Ukraine is joining NATO not to defy Russia, but rather in pursuit of being a successful country; that Moscow itself currently is actively involved in cooperation with the Alliance, a thing though not much advertised by the Kremlin. They should be told that Moscow and Brussels not only cooperate through political consultations, but their cooperation has a serious practical basis. Thus Russia has maintained long and fruitful military-technical cooperation with the Alliance. It is indicative that, unlike Ukrainian *Ukrspetsexport*, their Russian counterpart *Rosvooruzhenie* maintains a representative office to NATO. This should be told, indeed. Otherwise the Ukrainian authorities are embarrassing themselves in front of the Western partners, making it appear that Ukraine is joining NATO in a covert way.



It should be explained to Ukrainian citizens that Ukraine's integration with NATO is a critical incentive for economic and political transformations, that it enables establishment of a system of democratic values in the country and improves popular welfare. "Throughout the past decade, the NATO enlargement process - like the process of enlargement of the European Union - has proven to be a powerful tool for encouraging governments in Central and Eastern Europe to implement difficult democratic reforms, which in turn have made these states more stable and reliable partners, both for their Allies in NATO and for their other neighbors", Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said elsewhere.

We can only add that the NATO door has been passed through by all countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which have become members of the European Union over the last decade. This point is vital. For as it came out from an opinion poll conducted in May by the Razumkov Center and KIIS, Ukraine's accession to the European Union is supported by 50.8% respondents, with less than one third against it (29,8%).

To raise the Alliance's rating it would be appropriate to explain to Ukrainians that joining NATO will not only motivate the law-enforcement agencies to improve, but also make civil control over them more efficient. In parallel, the State solves social problems experienced by military men. You may remember that, unlike Russia, Ukraine and other Commonwealth of Independent States members, Alliance Member States have no officers destitute of private lodging. Sufficient funding of law-enforcement agencies is a mandatory condition imposed by the Alliance since it is a prerequisite of stability. It should not be forgotten that carrying the burden of defense construction throughout the whole perimeter is one thing. And a totally different thing is to do that within a collective defense system where each country is responsible for its own segment.

Naturally, the Ukrainian authorities should pursue their information policy with due account of the regional specifics of our country and age-old mentality of our population. It is exactly what was missing in the governmental *State Program for Informing the Public on Euroatlantic Integration Issues for 2004-2007*. Its shortcomings included the fact that it was a formality. Plus the government had little to fund its implementation....

Right now the people of Eastern Ukraine would benefit from knowing that NATO helped mitigate the consequences of the sewage system accident in Kharkiv and that the Alliance is ready to allocate about 10 million Euros for ammunition disposition. Note that Ukraine keeps over 2 million tones of ammunition from World Wars I and II and its own capabilities only allow disposition of about 60 thousand tonnes per year. One should not forget either that a USD 5 million fund for ammunition and nuclear fuel disposition already exists within the Partnership for Peace program. And this fund will shortly start operating. Western Ukrainians can be reminded that NATO helped them mitigate the consequences of floods.

Of course, an effective information campaign needs a new strategic plan. And, according to President Viktor Yushchenko, Kyiv is preparing it. (In this connection, by the way, we may be reminded that a few non-governmental organizations jointly with the NATO-Ukraine Civic League and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine prepared a "National Information Strategy of Euroatlantic Integration of Ukraine", which will provide that basis for the new governmental program.) Yet official Kyiv must hurry. Because in order for the country to join NATO, the Ukrainian authorities, pursuant to the North Atlantic Organization's internal procedures, shall conduct a national referendum. And the level of public support has to be over fifty per cent...

Ihor Nykyforov

CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION

Signed at Washington, London, and Moscow April 10, 1972

Ratification advised by U.S. Senate December 16, 1974

Ratified by U.S. President January 22, 1975

U.S. ratification deposited at Washington, London, and Moscow March 26, 1975

Proclaimed by U.S. President March 26, 1975

Entered into force March 26, 1975

The States Parties to this Convention,

Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction, and convinced that the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and their elimination, through effective measures, will facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recognizing the important significance of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on June 17, 1925, and conscious also of the contribution which the said Protocol has already made, and continues to make, to mitigating the horrors of war,

Reaffirming their adherence to the principles and objectives of that Protocol and calling upon all States to comply strictly with them,

Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of June 17, 1925,

Desiring to contribute to the strengthening of confidence between peoples and the general improvement of the international atmosphere,

Desiring also to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Convinced of the importance and urgency of eliminating from the arsenals of States, through effective measures, such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as those using chemical or bacteriological (biological) agents,

Recognizing that an agreement on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons represents a first possible step towards the achievement of agreement on effective measures also for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and determined to continue negotiations to that end,

Determined, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons,



Convinced that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind and that no effort should be spared to minimize this risk,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:

(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;

(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.

Article II

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to destroy, or to divert to peaceful purposes, as soon as possible but not later than nine months after the entry into force of the Convention, all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention, which are in its possession or under its jurisdiction or control. In implementing the provisions of this article all necessary safety precautions shall be observed to protect populations and the environment.

Article III

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of States or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention.

Article IV

Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention, within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere.

Article V

The States Parties to this Convention undertake to consult one another and to cooperate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention. Consultation and cooperation pursuant to this article may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.

Article VI

(1) Any State Party to this Convention which finds that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should include all possible evidence confirming its validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the Security Council.

(2) Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to cooperate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the



Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the Convention of the results of the investigation.

Article VII

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to any Party to the Convention which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party has been exposed to danger as a result of violation of the Convention.

Article VIII

Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on June 17, 1925.

Article IX

Each State Party to this Convention affirms the recognized objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons and, to this end, undertakes to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and for their destruction, and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for the production or use of chemical agents for weapons purposes.

Article X

(1) The States Parties to this Convention undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. Parties to the Convention in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing individually or together with other States or international organizations to the further development and application of scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology) for prevention of disease, or for other peaceful purposes.

(2) This Convention shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties to the Convention or international cooperation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities, including the international exchange of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins and equipment for the processing, use or production of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.

Article XI

Any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Convention and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the date of acceptance by it.

Article XII

Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, or earlier if it is requested by a majority of Parties to the Convention by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, a conference of States Parties to the Convention shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of the Convention, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, including the provisions

concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, are being realized. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention.

Article XIII

(1) This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

(2) Each State Party to this Convention shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Convention if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the Convention, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties to the Convention and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article XIV

(1) This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph (3) of this Article may accede to it at any time.

(2) This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

(3) This Convention shall enter into force after the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty-two Governments, including the Governments designated as Depositaries of the Convention.

(4) For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

(5) The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, and of the receipt of other notices.

(6) This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article XV

This Convention, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of the Convention shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding states.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Convention.

DONE in triplicate, at the cities of Washington, London and Moscow, this tenth day of April, one thousand nine hundred and seventy-two.

